We emphasize that standard quantum theory (SQT) is incomplete because it doesn't describe what is experimentally observed, namely events, nor does it satisfactorily define the circumstances under which events may occur. Simple models are given (all of which have the same density matrix evolution) to illustrate schemes which claim to complete SQT. It is shown how the model based upon the Continuous Spontaneous Localization (CSL) theory, in which an individual statevector undergoes "True Collapse," gives a satisfactory description of events. It is argued that various "decoherence" based approaches, illustrated by models in which a density matrix undergoes "False Collapse," do not satisfactorily resolve these problems of SQT.
Introduction
The abrupt change by measurement. . . is the most interesting point of the entire theory.
Erwin Schrödinger
1
To restrict quantum mechanics to be exclusively about piddling laboratory operations is to betray the great enterprise.
John Bell
2
What is wrong with standard quantum theory (SQT)? Doesn't it give wonderful agreement with every experiment so far performed? Then why should anyone wish to change it? I had better say what I mean by SQT. I mean the usual formalism which results in a statevector, taken to correspond to the physical reality we see around us in Nature, 3 evolving with time, together with the Born probability rule. A structure which modifies (adds to, and/or alters) this shall either be called an interpretation of SQT or a different theory.
What is wrong with SQT is its description of quantum events. It doesn't describe them. Consider a particle counting experiment being conducted by an experimenter while a theoretician does a parallel real time calculation using SQT. The experimenter sets up the apparatus while the theoretician sets up the initial statevector. While the experimenter turns on the apparatus and monitors its smooth functioning, the theoretician follows the smooth evolution of the statevector according to Schrödinger's equation. Suddenly, the experimenter sings out "An event has occurred, and this is the result." Abruptly, the theoretician stops his calculation, replaces the statevector, which has by now become the sum of states corresponding to different possible outcomes of the experiment, by the one state which the experimenter told him had actually occurred, and then continues his calculation of the smooth evolution of the statevector.
In other words, the practitioner of SQT must go outside the theory, to obtain additional information, in order to use the theory correctly. What is missing is that the theory doesn't give the probability that an event occurs between t and t + dt. (One doesn't expect the theory to give the precise time an event occurs: that choice may be attributed to a fundamental probabilistic feature of nature.) Instead, the Born probability rule says, if an event occurs, then these are the possible results and their chances. Thus the description by SQT of every experiment is insufficient because events take place in every experiment and SQT fails to describe them. 4 A theory which gives a conditional probability alone is incapable of shedding light on the nature of the thing that is conditioned upon. Would we not say that something important is missing from a theory whose sole statement is, "If a cataclysmic event occurs in the solar system, then here are the possible things that can happen to the earth and their chances?" It might be useful to know the chances of destruction and the forms it may take, but would we not be curious about the missing portion of the description? Would we not want to know something about when it might occur, to inquire about the causes of cataclysmic events, about what makes the sun explode, or an asteroid stray our way, even though we might never be able to affect those events? How has it been that we have been so incurious about what makes quantum events? Perhaps because the situation has been more like, "If a profitable financial event occurs, then here are the possibilities and their chances." We have been so busy reaping the profits of quantum theory that we have not cared to inquire about the cause of the profitable events.
Tacit in this discussion was the assumption that we know how to choose the"preferred basis" which specifies the catalog of possible events. But SQT doesn't tell us this either. Interpretations attempt to supply the missing information. The so-called (there are many variants) Copenhagen interpretation (CI) declares that the preferred basis describes the results of measurements by an apparatus. But it doesn't say what is an apparatus or a measurement (and it doesn't tell us if or how events can occur in other situations). Again, we must go outside the theory, to obtain ad hoc ("for this case only") information to use the theory. Useful? Wonderfully. CI is a good practical guide for working physicists. Measurement by an apparatus is like great art, we know it when we see it-and we have great artists who can bring it about. But, a complete theoretical description? No.
To summarize, SQT has two unsolved problems, which I shall call the "events problem" (what is the probability that an event occurs in any time interval?) and the "preferred basis" problem (given that the event occurs, what are the possible outcomes?), i.e., "when?" and "what?"
How might one approach solving the events problem? Consider an analogous situation in classical mechanics. An experimenter throws a ball toward a wall while a theoretician follows its smooth evolution according to Newton's second law. Suddenly the experimenter sings out, "It hit the wall, and this is now its position and velocity." Abruptly the theoretician stops the calculation, replaces the position and velocity by the new values and continues the calculation of the smooth evolution of the ball. Clearly one would think, "This is not a complete theoretical description," and one would procede to incorporate the wall (and the ball's interaction with it) into Newton's second law so that the theoretical description is self contained. It seems equally clear that quantum theory needs to have (what amounts to) the wall put in.
In the Continuous Spontaneous Localization 4−6 (CSL) theory, a term is added to Schrödinger's equation, resulting in a smoothly evolving statevector which describes events. The modified equation produces
instead of what SQT produces:
The additional term contains a randomly fluctuating field, and it is this field which determines the events that actually occur. Thus the theory gives an explanation as to why we get a different result when we repeat the same experiment (the field fluctuated like this rather than like that), in contrast to SQT which gives no reason at all why events occur. Eq.(1.1) describes what I call True Collapse 7 . In section 2, I shall give a simple mathematical model of it, using the CSL formalism. This simple model does not do full justice to the physical ideas contained in the full-blown CSL theory. In particular, it does not show how the equations use the particle number basis to solve the preferred basis problem, nor how they make collapse very slow for microscopic objects and very fast for macroscopic objects. (Also not touched upon here are interesting interpretational aspects of CSL, the pictures of spacetime reality that it allows, the successes and problems of a relativistic generalization, the status of experimental tests: the reader is referred to the references.)
There are a number of schemes, so-called "decoherence" interpretations, which claim to be able to describe events without altering Schrödinger's evolution of the statevector, i.e., without providing a collapse picture. In this paper I shall examine whether these schemes do provide satisfactory criteria for identifying events. In sections 3.1-3.3 I shall give two simple examples of one approach (dubbed here False Collapse of the first kind) based upon the behavior of the density matrix describing an ensemble of statevectors, each of which evolves like (1.2). (Each statevector in the ensemble may be thought of as describing the interaction of a system with a different bath state.) I shall argue that this gives no help in explaining the occurrence of events.
In sections 4.1-4.2, I shall give simple examples of two schemes (dubbed here False Collapse of the second kind), the Environmental Selection Interpretation (ESI) and the Decoherent Histories Interpretation 9 (DHI). They are based upon the behavior of a partial trace of the density matrix constructed from a single statevector which evolves like (1.2). I shall argue that these, too, are not satisfactory.
Lastly, in section 5, I shall give a simple example of how a no-collapse scheme can account for events. However, it requires adding new dynamical variables to physics. The point I wish to make is that you cannot hope to describe events "on the cheap," without adding something new to SQT.
A True Collapse Model
One line of development would be to have the jump in the equations and not just the talk-so that it would come about as a dynamical process in dynamically defined conditions. . . . It would be good to know how this could be done.
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For illustrative purposes I shall present a pale imitation of the full-blown CSL theory. Suppose that normal hamiltonian evolution has produced the statevector
where |a > and |b > are eigenstates of an operator A with eigenvalues a and b. These states may be thought of as describing different "pointer positions," i.e., as macroscopically different. The statevector evolution is presumed governed thereafter by the modified Schrödinger equation
with H = 0 (H may be supposed negligible because now it only affects the internal evolution of the pointer states). In Eq.(2.2), w(t) is an arbitrary function of time (in the mathematical class of white noise "functions"), and λ is the collapse rate (a fundamental parameter of the theory). If you put any w(t) into Eq.(2.2) you will find the statevector |ψ, t > w which has evolved under it. But, what is the probability that nature has chosen this w(t)? To answer this question the model supplies a second equation, a probability rule:
Eq.(2.3) says that the largest norm statevectors are most probable (the evolution (2.2) is nonunitary, so the statevector norm changes with time). In Eq.(2.3), Dw is the functional integral element:
Since I shall use functional notation, I will say a bit about it. The way to look at an expression such as
it. That is, replace the continuous variable t by t n replace the integral over t by a sum over n, treat each w(t n ) like an ordinary variable and treat dt like a number: thus this expression = 1. We can easily write the solution of Eq. (2.2) with the initial condition (2.1) because the result only depends upon B(T ) ≡ T 0 dtw(t):
apart from an overall factor F which is a functional I shall not bother to write down. We can now use Eq.(2.3) to find the probability that a particular B(t) (and the statevector it engenders) occurs in Nature. Taking the scalar product of (2.5) with itself, and integrating over w(t) for all t except T , we obtain for the probability that B(T ) lies in the interval B to B + dB:
From Eq.(2.6) we see that, as T increases, the only probable values of B lie within a few standard deviations √ λT of either 2λT a or 2λT b. In the former case, the statevector (2.5) asymptotically approaches const.|a >, while in the latter case it asymptotically approaches const.|b >. (The constants are of no significance since it is the statevector's direction in Hilbert space that contains the information about reality: the statevector can be renormalized at any time.) Moreover, in the former case, the integrated probability (2.6) asymptotically approaches |α| 2 and in the later case approaches |β| 2 . Thus the statevector evolves into one or another of the macroscopically distinct states, and does so with the frequencies predicted by SQT.
To summarize, Schrödinger's evolution of the statevector can be modified, in a well-defined and reasonably simple way, so as to give good agreement with SQT's predictions while describing events (paralleling the occurrence of each event in Nature with collapse of a probable statevector).
We close this section by displaying the density matrix which describes the behavior of the ensemble of (normalized) solutions to Eq.(2.2) which occur with probability (2.3):
The reason why the off-diagonal elements of the density matrix (2.7) are exponentially decaying is because the individual statevector collapses (corresponding to different B(T )'s) occur at different times.
False Collapse Of The First Kind
If it looks like a duck but it don't walk like a duck or quack like a duck then it ain't a duck.
Variant of an old saying
For my first example of a decoherence scheme I shall consider a a simple model of the interaction of the system described by the operator A with an environment. We suppose that each time the system is put into a thermal bath it encounters a different bath state, and one can assign probabilities to these encounters. The claim is that interaction of the system with the bath brings on occurrences of events.
Consider the initial statevector (2.1) which evolves unitarily under the Schrödinger equation
In Eq.(3.1), w(t) is a sample function of white noise (representing the influence of the bath). That is, we assume repeated evolutions actually differ in w(t), whose probability of appearance satisfies the probability rule:
It follows from Eqs.(2.1) and (3.1) that the statevector at any time T which evolves under a particular w(t) is
Now, according to Eq.(3.3), NOTHING has HAPPENED, i.e., the statevector is still a superposition of the states |a > and |b > with unchanged squared amplitudes. Of course, the phases of the amplitudes are changing, but certainly one cannot find in this statevector evidence that an event occurred or, supposing that an event occurred, whether it resulted in a or b.
Nonetheless, proponents of the point of view I am expounding are unphased (sic), and they turn to the density matrix:
The False Collapse claim is that, at some large time, when the off-diagonal density matrix elements are suitably small (in current parlance, at the decoherence time), an event (a or b) occurs for any system. This claim makes no sense, for two reasons. The behavior of an ensemble of evolutions which have not taken place cannot be crucial in determining the occurrence of an event in one evolution which did take place (what is not real cannot have an effect upon what is real). If no individual statevector describes events, an ensemble of these statevectors cannot do so (a property missing in each element of a collection must be missing in the collection). Therefore this scheme cannot solve the events problem. Although the density matrices (2.7) and (3.4) have the same form, this does not mean that the arguments leading to these expressions are equally sound.
Against Decoherence
In order to properly assess the meaning of Eq.(3.4), I believe it is salutary to avoid using the phrase "decoherence" time because that seems to imply that there is a physical process called decoherence which takes this amount of time to be completed. I suggest that the phrase"No One Will Ever kNow" time, or NOWEN time for short, is more apt for the following reason.
If the statevector evolution is as described in the previous section, then an event does not occur at any time. Suppose, however, you (wrongly) claim that an event occurs at time T e . Suppose someone sets out to test your claim by performing a rapid experiment at time T = T e (then causing an event to occur) which tests if the system is in the state |φ >≡ µ|a > +ν|b >. If an event (a or b) did occur at time T e , the system will be found to be in the state |φ > with probability |α| 2 |µ| 2 + |β| 2 |ν| 2 . But actually, it follows from Eq.(3.4) that the probability is
The NOWEN time is, by definition, a time at which the last term in Eq.(3.5) is small enough to be beyond experimental resolution. Only if you chose T e to be equal to or greater than the NOWEN time will the experimental result be the same as if your claim were right. With this choice, No One Will Ever kNow that you were wrong.
A Simple Environment Model
The example in section 3.1 described the bath by the c-number w(t). Perhaps a more realistic example would be to include the bath states in the statevector. In this case, first, the density matrix for the ensemble of joint system + bath states is constructed. Then the bath states are traced over, and the NOWEN time is declared to be the time by which events have taken place.
I shall give an example of this here, largely because the simple environment bath model will be useful in the remainder of this paper.
Imagine a system which is bombarded by a succession of particles which briefly interact with it and then travel away. A simple model which captures the essence is to suppose that the n th particle has position coordinate W n , and that it interacts with the system during the time interval (t n , t n + ∆t) with hamiltonian AW n . Proceeding to the limit ∆t → 0 of a continuum of operators W n → W (t) which mutually commute, we have the evolution equation
We shall denote a joint position eigenvector by |{w} >, i.e., W (t)|{w} >= w(t)|{w} >: −∞ < w(t) < ∞. (One may think of |{w} > as the direct product of position eigenstates of W (t) for each vaue of t.) We now construct a unity-normalized state |{w} > N which is as close to an eigenstate of W (t) with eigenvalue w(t) as one wishes, i.e.,
is sharply peaked at w ′ − w = 0, and
(f is essentially the square root of a delta function.)
We suppose that, each time the system is put into the bath of these bombarding particles, the initial statevector is
and the probability that the bath state |{w} > N appears with eigenvalues {w(t)} is given by the white noise probability expression (3.2). The solution of Schrödinger's equation (3.6) with initial statevector (3.7) is |ψ, T >= αe
As in section 3.1 we cannot infer that an event has occurred from such a statevector. (This statement would still be correct had we chosen an initial statevector for the environment where f was not sharply peaked, so that each final state of system + environment would be an entangled one-see the next section.) Also, it follows from Eq.(3.8) that, if we construct the density matrix and trace over the environment states, we get the density matrix (3.4). This behavior of the statevector or density matrix is in no essential way different from what has already been described, and the critical remarks already expressed apply to it.
False Collapse of the Second Kind
The idea that elimination of coherence, in one way or another, implies the replacement of "and" by "or" is a very common one among solvers of the "measurement problem." It has always puzzled me.
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In this section I shall address the ESI. 8 Here, as in CSL, only one statevector represents the world. However, the world is divided into two: "the environment" and the rest. But ESI does not define what is meant by environment any better than CI defines apparatus. This already is a basis (pun!) for serious criticism: the very nature of the real world, the preferred basis, depends upon this undefined choice. Thus ESI does not resolve the preferred basis problem any better than does CI.
Moreover, the choice of the division affects the predicted times of events as well, so already the events problem is faring badly. But, never mind, suppose that we somehow know what is the system and what is the environment. Consider the following initial statevector belonging to the system + environment modeled in section 3.3:
where
. That is, each particle's position has an initial gaussian probability distribution. The evolution equation is (3.6). The resulting statevector is
where |{w} > t2 t1 is the joint position eigenstate of W (t) for t in the range {t 1 , t 2 }. The statevector (4.2) shows that the states |a > and |b > are now entangled with the "environment" particle states labeled by t from 0 to T (the particles labeled by t from T + to ∞ have yet to interact with the system, so their states are not yet entangled.) But, just as with the statevectors (3.3) and (3.8), this statevector gives no indication that an event (a or b) has occurred.
However, if one constructs the density matrix and traces over the environment, one gets for this reduced density matrix precisely the last two expressions in (3.4) . Again, the claim is made that either event a or b has taken place by the NOWEN time, i.e., there will be no difference between future behavior predicted by using the uncollapsed statevector (4.2) or by using the mixture of collapsed statevectors |a > |env a , T > and |b > |env b , T > (present in respective amounts |α| 2 and |β| 2 ). This ESI claim is demonstrably false. An experiment could detect interference, which would be missing for the mixture, between the two system + environment states which compose the actual statevector (4.2).
Here is an example in the context of our model. Suppose each W (t) represents the x-coordinate of an extremely massive particle at rest in the z = 0 plane, with y-coordinate t (take 0 ≤ t ≤ T ≥NOWEN time). Let A be the x-coordinate of an extremely massive particle (the A-particle) moving in the z = 0 plane in the y-direction with constant speed 1. As the A-particle passes each environment particle W (t) at time t, it briefly interacts with it. (The hamiltonian in the evolution equation (3.6) is consistent with this picture). Let the initial state be (4.1) (with D ∞ 0 replaced by D T 0 ). The A-particle is therefore in a superposition of two packets, one at A = a, the other at A = b.
After the A-particle has passed the last environment particle at y = T (resulting in the statevector (4.2) without the last line), let it encounter a corner reflector (corner placed on the y−axis, with walls at 45
• to the y−axis). Thus, when the A-particle has bounced off the two walls, it has changed the sign of its x-coordinate (so |a > and |b > have become | − a > and | − b >) and reversed its direction of motion, returning with speed 1 to collide with the row of environment particles in reverse order.
It really isn't necessary, but one can imagine placing four mirrors which take the A-particle out of the z = 0 plane for a while, and bring it back so that it is once again headed to encounter the row of environment particles in the order in which it first encountered them. Then, the Schrödinger evolution will effectively be the time-reverse of the previous evolution. That is, −a (−b) is the eigenvalue of A acting upon | − a > (| − b >) as well as the eigenvalue of −A acting upon |a > (|b >). Thus the effect of the evolution (3.6) upon the numerical coefficients in the state {(4.2) with |a > and |b > replaced by | − a > and | − b >} is the same as if A were replaced by −A and |a > and |b > were unchanged.
Thus, after the A-particle's second trip past the environment particles, the entanglement has been undone. The resulting state's system part, α| − a > +β| − b >, can certainly be distinguished from the purported mixture of states | − a > and | − b >.
ESI proponents reply to this that what they mean by an environment is something so complicated that FAPP 11 it would be impossible to do such interference experiments. This is the NOWEN philosophy par excellence. To base a fundamental physical principle upon it is no more justified than basing morality upon the principle that it is all right to steal if you don't get caught.
We conclude that ESI doesn't solve either the preferred basis problem or the events problem.
Against Decoherent Histories
It ain't over till it's over.
Yogi Berra I shall describe the DHI 9 somewhat differently than usual, namely, that the evolution is that of a single unitarily evolving statevector representing our world. (Usually, a unitarily evolving density matrix is considered. If it is pure, it is equivalent to a single statevector. If it is impure, it is equivalent to an ensemble of statevectors, which was criticized in section 3.1.) A certain "decoherence condition," (see Eq.(4.3) et.seq.) is applied to the density matrix constructed from this statevector. It is claimed that one can thereby extract a set of "histories," with each history characterised by a string of events (and a probability that this string is the one realized in our world). For each history, we are told of the times of the events and projection operators associated with these times. The predictions are the same as for a True Collapse theory where instantaneous collapses are characterized by applying each projection operator at the associated time to the otherwise unitarily evolving statevector.
Are a unique set of projection operators obtained from DHI? No. As in ESI, the world is divided into two parts, the part that is "coarse grained" and the part that is not (these may vary with time). Coarse graining means that the variables of this part are not to be distinguished by the projection operators. But, to be undistinguished does not mean to be unimportant. The coarse grained variables are usually crucial in determining which events are said to occur and when the events occur. The "environment" is a favorite candidate for these coarse grained variables. But, just as in ESI, these variables are not specified by DHI, and so the preferred basis problem is unsolved, and the events problem is given no unique solution.
But, never mind, suppose we somehow know that the coarse grained variables should be the environment in the model of the previous section. Suppose that (4.1) is the initial statevector. Let it evolve for time T ′ according to the Schrödinger evolution (3.6), at which time an experiment is done to see if the system is in state |φ >≡ µ|a > +ν|b > or |φ ′ >≡ ν * |a > −µ * |b >. The question we now ask is whether DHI assigns an event (a or b) to a time T < T ′ . The answer to this, we are told, is to consider the magnitude of the offdiagonal elements of the "Decoherence Functional," such as
(the decaying exponential is just < env b , T ′ |env a , T ′ >), where the projection operators |a >< a| and |b >< b| are applied at time T . If these elements are small enough to be neglected (according to some prearranged limit), an event is assigned to time T .
But, as can be seen from Eq.(4.3), the off-diagonal elements do not depend upon T , but only upon T ′ . That is, whether or not an event takes place at an earlier time depends upon the time that the later experiment is performed. In DHI, the past depends upon the future. Here is an example of how the arbitrarily distant future can affect the past. Suppose the above evolution takes place for an arbitrarily long time interval T ′ , after which the effectively time-reversed evolution described in section 4.1 takes place for an interval T ′ , followed by the experiment at time 2T
′ . Due to the evolution between T ′ and 2T ′ , the environment states coupled to |a > and |b > grow identical instead of near orthogonal, and so the decoherence condition is not satisfied. Thus, because of this future evolution (between T ′ and 2T ′ ), an event which would have otherwise occurred in the past (at T << T ′ ) never occurs at all. The decoherence condition is designed so NOWEN that DHI is wrong. If at any time in the future an experiment takes place that measures interference between earlier states which would otherwise be said to represent earlier alternative events, DHI disallows the occurrence of these events. One could imagine a theory in which the future has an effect on the immediate past, or a miniscule effect on the arbitrarily distant past, but it is hard to consider as satisfactory a description of past events which can be undone by behavior in the arbitrarily distant future. It is only when the statevector evolution is all over that DHI says for sure what the histories are. If the world goes on forever, DHI may well be characterized by the New York Lottery slogan, "Hey, ya never know." To have to wait until the end of the universe, or forever, to be able to describe events is not a solution of the events problem.
I shall conclude this section by mentioning the view a proponent of CSL could take of ESI and DHI. According to CSL, True Collapse from a superposition of states to one or another state is brought about by differences in particle locations in the different states: the more the differences, the faster the collapse. A decoherence condition may not predict events in situations when they do occur and vice versa. However, there are cases where the differences in particle locations are such that CSL says events occur, and the choice of the environment or coarse graining is such that False Collapsers will also say that events occur. Although it is unlikely that the latter will get such details as the time of events right, these differences may be unobservable. Thus these approaches may be regarded, just as CI may, as FAPP 11 procedures for predicting that events will occur in some cases.
Index Model
There is more in heaven and earth. . .
William Shakespeare
There are two reasons why the False Collapse approaches fail to satisfactorily handle events. The first is that they hope to rely upon known objects in spacetime to provide the preferred basis, but this does not seem to be do-able in a well-defined way. The second is that the states describing such objects can evolve from near-orthogonality (which is what is used as a criteria for events) back to nonorthogonality (which undermines the predictions of events).
It is perhaps interesting to see that the program of describing events by a unitarily evolving statevector could go through if the objects which determine the preferred basis are not the usual objects in spacetime, and if the evolution is such that their orthogonality, once achieved, cannot be undone. Models illustrating this can be made, 12−14 and I shall end this paper by giving one, partially to serve as a bridge on which False Collapsers and True Collapsers may meet.
Consider the initial statevector (4.1) evolving unitarily according to the Schrödinger equation d|ψ, t > dt = −i2λAΠ(t)|ψ, t >, [W (t), Π(t ′ )] = iδ(t − t ′ ) (5.1)
The W (t)'s are to represent new and fundamental variables of Nature (beyond the usual particles and fields), each of which Nature allows to interact with the system (composed of the usual particles and fields) only for a brief interval dt, and never again. The resulting statevector is According to Eq. (5.2), the evolution correlates each CSL state (2.5) (which evolves under a w(t)) to an "environment" state (labeled by that w(t)). The statevector is the "sum" of these correlated product states (with the correct CSL probability weighting). Each of these states in the "sum" is a history. One history, chosen on-line "by God" (utilizing SQT's transition probabilities as each state "forks" into its unique orthogonal alternatives) represents reality and the others represent unrealized possibilities. There is a satisfactory solution to the preferred basis problem: the preferred basis is well defined by the orthogonal "environment" basis. There is a satisfactory solution to the events problem: the nonorthogonal system states (correlated to the orthogonal "environment" basis states) describe the macroscopic system undergoing True Collapse to state a or b.
Of course, this model is physically completely equivalent to the True Collapse model of section 2. It suggests that density matrix's False Collapse only makes sense if, actually, it corresponds to statevector's True Collapse.
